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473 
Sacrificing Liberty for Security: North Carolina’s 
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure of Arrestee 
DNA 
“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the police bursting into your home in the middle of the 
night, waking you and your family from peaceful sleep.  As the police 
enter your home unannounced, they rummage through all of your office 
files and sift through the information stored on your computer.  You 
demand to see a search warrant as the police officers access all of your 
most personal and confidential information.  One officer harshly replies 
that they do not need a warrant.  You are left perplexed: that goes 
against everything you ever learned about the Fourth Amendment.  You 
can only wonder why the police are allowed to search your home and 
seize your files without any sort of probable cause or search warrant.  
You wonder why the police feel entitled to intrude into your deepest ex-
pectation of privacy.  How can they commit this end-run around the 
Fourth Amendment? 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is about 
privacy.2  At its very core, the Amendment serves to preserve individual 
privacy by safeguarding against government intrusions.  When the gov-
ernment invades an individual’s privacy, it may do so only with specified 
reasons—reasons that have been well-defined throughout Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and are subject to strict judicial review and 
scrutiny.3 
In July 2010, North Carolina became the twenty-fourth state to pass 
a law permitting warrantless and suspicionless government intrusion in-
 
 1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 2. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“[T]he security of one’s pri-
vacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police [is] . . . at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment and basic to a free society.” (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
 3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
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to an individual’s expectation of privacy.4  This law permits law en-
forcement to seize the private, genetic information of persons arrested 
for certain crimes and to conduct a highly invasive, continual search of 
that private information.5  This North Carolina law implicates significant 
Fourth Amendment concerns and runs afoul of the entire purpose of 
that Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment forbids intrusions into the 
body, and it protects the genetic privacy of people who have never been 
charged—or even convicted—of any crime.  Through this law, North 
Carolina strips the rights of citizens—who are presumed innocent—and 
redefines them as the rights of convicted felons.6  North Carolina’s al-
lowance of a warrantless, investigatory search of its citizens’ Deoxyribo-
nucleic Acid (DNA) is an “anathema to the Fourth Amendment” and 
should be held unconstitutional.7 
This Comment examines the constitutionality of North Carolina’s 
DNA Database Act of 2010.8  The Act is a newly passed expansion of the 
 
 4. See DNA Database Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 94 (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 15A-266.2 to -266.8, 15A-266.11 to -266.12, 15A-502.1, 15A-534(a), 7B-2201 
(2011)); see also infra note 17 for a list of the other states authorizing DNA collection at 
arrest. 
 5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266.2 to -266.8, 15A-266.11 to -266.12, 15A-502.1, 
15A-534(a), 7B-2201. 
 6. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266.2 to -266.8, 15A-266.11 to -266.12, 15A-
502.1, 15A-534(a), 7B-2201, with Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) 
(“[P]arolees are on the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments.  On this continuum, 
parolees have fewer expectations of privacy . . . .”) (citations omitted)), United States v. 
Lujan, 504 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the constitutionality of requiring con-
victed felons on supervised release to submit blood samples for DNA analysis as a condi-
tion of their release), United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
the constitutionality of compulsory DNA profiling of certain conditionally-released fed-
eral offenders in the absence of individualized suspicion that the offender committed ad-
ditional crimes because the minimal intrusion on privacy was outweighed by the over-
whelming societal interests served by the profiling), Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 
1248 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (upholding the constitutionality of requiring persons convicted 
of nonviolent and nonsexual felonies to submit DNA samples for a national database be-
cause the minimal intrusion in taking a sample is outweighed by the government interest 
in DNA collection for identification for purposes of crime solving, supervision of paro-
lees and probationers, and reducing recidivism), and Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 259 
F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of requiring parolees 
to submit DNA samples as a condition of parole). 
 7. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
 8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266.2 to -266.8, 15A-266.11 to -266.12, 15A-502.1, 15A-
534(a), 7B-2201. 
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existing state DNA database, and this Comment argues that North Caro-
lina’s expansion authorizes a constitutionally impermissible, mandatory, 
suspicionless, and warrantless search and seizure of DNA and the infor-
mation contained therein.9  With warrantless searches, the default rule is 
that they are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.”10  The Act should not survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny be-
cause it does not qualify as a well-delineated exception to the warrant 
requirement: it is not a search incident to a lawful arrest,11 it authorizes a 
search without probable cause or exigent circumstances,12 it is unjustifi-
able as a special needs search,13 and it does not survive basic balancing 
test scrutiny.14  Those directly impacted by the Act are arrestees for par-
ticular crimes.  Although not convicted of the crime, their bodies are in-
vaded, their DNA seized, and their personal, genetic information is given 
to the state and federal government for further search and analysis.15 
I.  THE ENCROACHMENT BEGINS 
A.   The Expansion and Popularization of DNA Databases 
Within the past several years, many states have passed laws to ex-
pand or establish their DNA databases to include the DNA samples of 
arrestees for certain crimes.16  Currently, twenty-five states and the fed-
 
 9. Id. § 15A-266.2(2) (‘“DNA’ means deoxyribonucleic acid.  DNA is located in the 
cells and provides an individual’s personal genetic blueprint. DNA encodes genetic in-
formation that is the basis of human heredity and forensic identification.”). 
 10. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 11. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (establishing the search incident 
to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement). 
 12. Id. at 227, 242 (requiring probable cause or exigent circumstances to search 
without a warrant). 
 13. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that an agency may invoke the special needs exception “in those exceptional circums-
tances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable”). 
 14. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (“[The Court] must eva-
luate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by [balancing an 
individual’s privacy interests against] legitimate governmental interests.”). 
 15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266.2 to -266.8, 15A.11 to -266.12, 15A-502.1, 15A-
534(a), 7B-2201 (2011)). 
 16. According to the Council for Responsible Genetics, 
[Fifty-six] countries worldwide operate national DNA databases from Asia to 
Europe and the Americas.  Some are still in their infancy, while others such as 
3
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eral government authorize DNA collection at arrest.17  In promoting the 
expansion of these databases, lawmakers cite justifications such as the 
increased resolution of cold cases or the exoneration of innocent people 
in jail.18  Many legislators have simply called the idea of seizing DNA 
from an arrestee the twenty-first century’s version of fingerprinting.19  
Though these justifications are laudible, this Comment illustrates how 
they are misguided. 
While politicians claim to act in the best interest of the criminal jus-
tice system, other motives exist.  States are prompted to adopt arrestee 
DNA collection schemes in response to federal programs offering addi-
tional funding to laboratories that retain a backlog of DNA samples.20  
Essentially, the federal government is willing to give states more money 
if those states have a backlog of untested DNA samples.21  In response to 
the potential receipt of federal money, states are passing laws requiring 
more DNA samples to be taken in order to allow the state to increase 
backlog and thereby increase the amount of federal dollars coming into 
 
those in the United States and the United Kingdom are large, highly sophisti-
cated and have been established for at least fifteen years.  The growing number 
of DNA databases differ widely both in the categories of individuals included in 
the databases and in the allowed usages of the databases themselves. . . . 
  In the United States, all 50 states and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
maintain DNA databases. 
Introduction and Summary of Findings, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/exec.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2012). 
 17. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Flor-
ida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.  Quarterly Forensic DNAResource Report, 
DNARESOURCE.COM (Jan. 2012), http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/2012_1.pdf.  
North Carolina’s law went into effect on February 1, 2011.  2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 94, § 
15. 
 18. Audio recording: North Carolina House Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 
2010) [hereinafter Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 2010)] 
(statement of Rep. Wil Neumann) (on file with author). 
 19. Lynn Bonner, Perdue Signs DNA Bill, THE NEWS & OBSERVER BLOG (July 15, 2010, 
10:44 AM), http://projects.newsobserver.com/under_the_dome/perdue_signs_dna_bill. 
 20. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546 § 2, 114 
Stat. 2726, 2726 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a).  Other similar acts 
are the Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006) and the Fingerprint Act of 
2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006). 
 21. Mark Nelson, Making Sense of DNA Backlogs—Myths vs. Reality, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUST. SPECIAL REP., June 2010, at 1. 
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the state.22  Essentially, more samples equals more money.  In addition 
to funding the creation of more state backlogs, the United States House 
of Representatives passed the Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection 
Act in May 2010, which creates further incentives for states to collect 
DNA samples from arrestees.23 
Federal incentives promote the processing of offender DNA samples 
instead of actual DNA evidence from crime scenes.24  Under these incen-
tives, an estimated 51,000 DNA samples from arrestees move to the head 
of the testing line while DNA evidence from crime scenes and rape kits 
go untested.25  The expansion of DNA databases contributes to the con-
tinuing backlog of unprocessed rape kits and other evidence so states 
may fill their coffers.26  While sold as tools for law enforcement, DNA 
databases are instead used to generate revenue in sluggish economies 
and fill gaps in states’ budgets with the federal dollars coming in because 
of the creation of the backlog.27  In addition to the financial incentives 
involved, many opponents believe that the measures to expand DNA col-
lection are nothing but the product of a lobbying push from companies 
that would profit from increased testing sales and sales in equipment and 
chemicals utilized in DNA collection and processing.28  Whatever the 
 
 22. See DNARESCOURCE.COM, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 23. Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010, H.R. 4614, 111th Cong. § 2 
(2d Sess. 2010). 
 24. Id. 
 25. SARAH STONE, FISCAL RESEARCH DIV., GEN. ASSEMB. OF N.C., LEGISLATIVE 
INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE to DNA Database Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 94 
(2010). 
 26. One author noted this problem was already occurring as early as 2001.  In ex-
amining that year’s numbers, he wrote: 
[T]here are approximately 500,000 samples . . . waiting to be profiled and en-
tered into databases, and an estimated one million . . . [convicts] who have not 
yet given samples.  With an estimated thirteen to fifteen million arrests in 
1998, any expansion of the classes of criminals covered by databases would on-
ly compound this problem. 
Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in Ameri-
ca, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 945 (2001). 
 27. The Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010, H.R. 4614, increases 
allocation to certain states with expanded DNA databases by five and ten percent. 
 28. Ben Protess, The DNA Debacle: How the Federal Government Botched the DNA 
Backlog Crisis, PROPUBLICA (May 5, 2009, 7:40 AM) 
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-dna-debacle-how-the-federal-government-botched-
the-backlog-crisis-505.  The article states: 
  The expansion of DNA collection laws has been promoted by a lobbying 
firm with close ties to both the Justice Department and to companies that profit 
directly from increased DNA testing, a ProPublica investigation has found. 
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reasoning, North Carolina has joined the coalition of states that require 
the search and seizure of DNA samples from arrestees—people who 
supposedly enjoy a presumption of innocence. 
B.  North Carolina Updates its Database 
The DNA Database Act of 2010 (Act), a product of contentious de-
bate during the North Carolina General Assembly’s 2010 short session, 
ultimately passed on July 10, 2010 and was signed into law five days lat-
er by Governor Bev Perdue.29  With a quick stroke of her pen, the Gov-
ernor gave effect to massive changes to North Carolina law, changes that 
arguably constitute one of the greatest intrusions into personal privacy 
in recent state history.  The Act represents not only an unprecedented 
departure from the protections of personal privacy, but also an unconsti-
tutional authorization of an unreasonable search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The DNA Database Act of 2010 completely rewrote and expanded 
Article 13 of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes.30  The 
most controversial section of the Act requires law enforcement officials 
to collect DNA samples from suspects upon arrest for certain enume-
rated crimes.31  Additionally, the Act mandates that the magistrate shall 
incarcerate the arrestee without bail if the arrestee refuses to submit a 
DNA sample.32 
 
  The firm, Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs, lobbies the Jus-
tice Department and lawmakers on behalf of the world’s leading producer of 
DNA testing equipment. 
Id. 
 29. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 94, § 15 (2010). 
 30. DNA Database Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 94, sec. 2–11 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266.2 to -266.8, 15A-266.11 to -266.12 (2011)).  Before the changes 
in question, the law required DNA samples to be taken from people convicted of certain 
crimes.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (2009).  The constitutionality of that portion of the 
law is not in question, and is a well-settled question due to the diminished expectation of 
privacy of convicted felons.  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (“[P]arolees 
are on the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments.  On this continuum, parolees have 
fewer expectations of privacy . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A (2011).  The Act supplemented previous North 
Carolina law, which only required law enforcement to collect DNA information from 
people upon conviction of certain offenses.  For a list of these crimes, see infra note 67. 
 32. Id. § 15A-534(a).  The Act states, “the judicial official shall make the collection of 
the fingerprints or DNA sample a condition of pretrial release” if the arrestee refuses to 
provide a DNA sample.  Id. (emphasis added).  The implications of this are beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
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Before entering into an examination of the constitutionality of the 
Act, it is essential to understand the requirements of the Act and the 
procedures by which DNA information is taken.  The Act established the 
State DNA Databank (Databank) and the State DNA Database (Data-
base), both of which are under the administration of the State Bureau of 
Investigation (SBI).33  The Databank serves as the repository for all phys-
ical DNA samples collected.34  For example, the physical cheek swab 
containing the DNA donor’s saliva will be stored in the Databank.  The 
Database is the computer record of all DNA profiles collected.35  The 
DNA records in the Database come from the DNA samples collected 
from crime scene evidence, arrestees, convicted persons, sex offenders 
who are required to provide a DNA sample by statute, unidentified per-
sons and body parts, missing persons, relatives of missing persons, and 
anonymous DNA profiles used for quality control methods.36 
After the initial seizure of the biological material, the samples are 
sent to an SBI laboratory where they are eventually analyzed, and a ge-
netic profile is generated.37  This genetic profile, often erroneously la-
beled as a DNA fingerprint, is a digital representation of thirteen to fif-
teen segments of the subject’s DNA code.38 
After the DNA profile is generated, it is uploaded into the Database, 
and the physical sample is sent for storage in the Databank.39  After the 
profile is uploaded into the Database, the SBI must provide the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with all DNA records contained in the Da-
tabase to allow the FBI to compare those state DNA records to the 
records already contained in the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS), a national database.40 
 
 33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  Section 15A-266.2 states, “The results of all DNA identification analyses on 
an individual’s DNA sample are . . . referred to as the DNA profile of an individual.”  Id. § 
15A-266.2. 
 36. Id. § 15A-266.3. 
 37. Id.  The biological sample is stored in the Databank, and the resulting profile is 
stored in the Database.  Id. 
 38. See Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 2010), supra note 
18 and accompanying text. 
 39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(e). 
 40. Id. § 15A-266.3. 
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1.  CODIS: What it is, and How it Works 
CODIS, a “generic term used to describe the FBI’s program of sup-
port for criminal justice DNA databases, as well as the software used to 
run these databases,”41 is a centralized database operated by the federal 
government that is searchable by law enforcement in local, state, and 
federal jurisdictions.42  CODIS includes three tiers of databases: (1) the 
National DNA Index System, which is maintained by the FBI; (2) a col-
lection of state DNA index systems; and (3) the local DNA index sys-
tems.43  CODIS contains two types of profiles: offender profiles, which 
are the individual samples taken from people; and forensic profiles, 
which come from crime scene evidence.44  As of December 2011, CODIS 
contained over ten million offender profiles and over 400,000 forensic 
profiles.45 
After the DNA profile is uploaded into CODIS, the profile is instan-
taneously compared to all of the crime scene samples in CODIS.46  
CODIS is designed to compare a DNA profile against all other DNA pro-
files in the database, and once a match is identified, the laboratories in-
volved are contacted, and CODIS establishes coordination between the 
law enforcement agencies.47  As long as a profile remains in CODIS, any 
new DNA samples from crime scenes will be compared to the profile.48  
 
 41. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. CODIS–NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 46. Professor Seringhaus describes the search as follows: 
  A complete DNA profile contains 26 numerical scores, corresponding to the 
nucleotide lengths at 26 alleles of the 13 different STR loci on both chromo-
somal copies. 
  The FBI CODIS markers are a set of 13 STRs spread across 12 of the 22 au-
tosomal chromosomes.  All 13 markers were specifically chosen from stretches 
of so-called ‘junk DNA,’ non-coding DNA not thought to be ‘associated with 
any known physical or medical characteristics.’ 
Michael Seringhaus, The Evolution of DNA Databases: Expansion, Familial Search, and the 
Need for Reform, THE INFORMATION SOC’Y, 12–13 (2009) (quoting United States v. Kin-
cade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004)), available at 
http://www.genome.duke.edu/seminars/journal-club/documents/Seringhaus_Oct09.pdf. 
 47. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, supra note 41. 
 48. See id. 
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Each week, the FBI performs an entire system search of all crime scene 
DNA profiles and all known individual profiles.49  Once a match between 
the sample and the database is made, the DNA evidence can lead to the 
arrest of the person for the unsolved crime, and the DNA evidence can 
be used in court.50 
A CODIS search can affect the person whose profile is included in 
the database in several ways.  When a profile in the database matches a 
profile taken from a crime scene, the agency that provided the DNA 
sample to the CODIS database is notified because of the implication that 
the person had, at some point, been present at the crime scene.51  The 
providing agency can then notify the agency with jurisdiction over the 
person of the identity of the person for questioning or arrest.52 
2.  CODIS: Keeping it in the Family 
Perhaps one of the more disturbing ways CODIS can affect a per-
son’s life is through familial searching.  Familial searches are a relatively 
new phenomenon, but have been the subject of much scrutiny because 
many states permit them.53  Familial searches are searches in CODIS 
where law enforcement uses the database to focus on a person whose 
DNA does not match the crime scene DNA evidence.54  The familial 
search is conducted on the belief that the person with the partial DNA 
match might be a relative of the culprit who provided the similar DNA 
sample.  Essentially, in a familial search, the law enforcement agency 
 
 49. Combined DNA Index System, DNA INITIATIVE, http://dna.gov/dna-databases/codis 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 50. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, supra note 41. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. State Rules on Partial/Familial Searching, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/usa/usa2.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2012).  Some states explicitly permit familial searching, while other courts implicitly al-
low it though legislative and judicial silence.  Id.  The states permitting familial searching 
and/or partial matching are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Washington, and Wyoming.  Id.  The states prohibiting familial searching, but allowing 
partial matching are Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  Id.  The 
states prohibiting partial matching and familial searching are Alaska, Georgia, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and 
Vermont.  Id.  The policies of the remaining states are unknown.  Id. 
 54. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, supra note 41.  It should be noted that this person is demonstrably inno-
cent of the crime.  See id. 
9
Crook: Sacrificing Liberty for Security: North Carolina's Unconstitution
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
CROOK-FINAL 3/23/2012  2:36 PM 
482 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:473 
searching a DNA database can examine the special inheritance patterns 
that link siblings, parents, children, and other close relatives to search 
for an offender’s kin.55  In 2008, California police used familial searching 
when investigating the crimes of a serial killer known as the “Grim Slee-
per.”56  In their investigations, the police used some of the killer’s DNA, 
which had been left at a crime scene, and began testing prison inmates to 
determine whether a family relationship to the killer could be discov-
ered.57  In their searches, one close relative was discovered, and using 
the information obtained, the police constructed a family tree and then 
“surreptitiously obtained a discarded pizza slice from the convict’s father.  
A DNA match came back.”58 
Familial DNA searching in a database is easy to perform, because 
the searcher only has to change the threshold on a database search.  
“Whereas an exact hit requires that all 26 alleles match at all 13 CODIS 
markers—signifying exact parity between two profiles—searches can 
also be performed at a lower stringency, reporting profiles that match at 
some fraction of the 26 alleles.”59  These near-matches are often useful in 
the case of degraded DNA, but because first-degree relatives are often a 
very close match, “a low stringency search with a crime-scene sample 
can sometimes return the offender’s close-matching relatives in the data-
base.”60  By requiring matches of fewer alleles, the search returns mul-
tiple hits with similar, though not exact, DNA profiles: i.e., family. 
These low-threshold searches will return thousands of matches, but 
by restricting the search geographically, law enforcement can, for exam-
ple, find the DNA profiles of an entire family living in a certain area.61  In 
the United Kingdom, where statistical analysis about DNA databases has 
been conducted, these familial searches provided a useful investigative 
lead approximately 10% of the time they were used.62  The United States 
has also seen success with familial searching, and as the popularity of 
 
 55. Seringhaus, supra note 46, at 26. 
 56. Joel Rubin, Grim Sleeper: How LAPD Followed the DNA to an Arrest, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (July 8, 2010, 11:11 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/07/how-
dna-led-to-the-arrest-of-the-grim-sleeper.html. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Eriq Gardner, Gene Swipe: Few DNA Labs Know Whether Chromosomes Are Yours 
or If You Stole Them, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2011, at 55, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/gene_swipe_few_dna_labs_know_whether_
chromosomes_are_yours_or_if_you_stole_. 
 59. Seringhaus, supra note 46, at 26. 
 60. Id. at 27. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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DNA databases grows, presumably so too will familial searches.  By in-
cluding more profiles in CODIS, it is likely that familial searching will be 
used with increasing frequency, resulting in more family members being 
considered suspects.63 
C.  So You’ve Been Arrested . . . Now What? 
The DNA Database Act of 2010 affects the arrest procedure and the 
order of events that occur after the arrest of an individual.  When ar-
rested pursuant to an arrest warrant, the arrestee’s DNA is seized either 
at the time of arrest or at the time of fingerprinting.64  If arrested without 
an arrest warrant, the arrestee first appears before a magistrate for a 
probable cause hearing in order to determine whether there was suffi-
cient probable cause for the arrest.65  If the magistrate determines that 
the requisite probable cause existed for the arrest, the DNA sample is 
seized from the arrestee.66 
It is essential to note that the probable cause hearing is to determine 
whether there was sufficient probable cause to justify the arrest, not 
whether there was sufficient probable cause to seize the DNA.  Addition-
ally, the crime for which the individual is arrested does not have to be a 
violent crime, nor does there have to be any DNA evidence involved 
with the crime at all.  Instead, the individual only has to be arrested for 
commission of one of the enumerated crimes in the statute.67  As long as 
 
 63. Familial searching is also a flawed tool in that it disproportionately affects the 
African-American population.  In the United States, African-Americans are overrepre-
sented in the prison system, thus their DNA comprises a disproportionately large percen-
tage of the samples in CODIS.  According to the Council for Responsible Genetics, 
“while African-Americans are only 12% of the U.S. population, their profiles constitute 
40% of the Federal database.”  Introduction and Summary of Findings, supra note 16.  Even 
more alarming are the numbers from the United Kingdom, where “nearly three-quarters 
of young men of African descent are in the database, as are tens of thousands of juve-
niles.”  Id. 
 64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A‑ 266.3A(b) (2011). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. § 15A-266.3A(f).  The statute provides that DNA must be taken upon arrest 
for the following crimes: 
First and Second Degree Murder. . . . Manslaughter. . . . Any offense in Article 
7A, Rape and Other Sex Offenses . . . . Felonious assault with deadly weapon 
with intent to kill or inflicting serious injury; . . . Assault inflicting serious bo-
dily injury; . . . Assault with a firearm or other deadly weapon upon govern-
mental officers or employees, company police officers, or campus police offic-
ers; . . . Assault with a firearm on a law enforcement, probation, or parole 
officer or on a person employed at a State or local detention facility; . . . Assault 
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the individual is arrested for one of the enumerated crimes, his DNA will 
be seized and searched.  There is no requirement that the seizure of the 
arrestee’s DNA be predicated by any probable cause or by any need for 
DNA evidence for the crime for which the arrestee has been arrested. 
The Act mandates that the DNA sample be taken by cheek swab, 
unless there is a court order in place requiring that the sample be a 
blood sample.68  If the arrestee refuses to provide a DNA sample, he 
“shall” be incarcerated until he complies with the statute and provides 
his DNA.69  The arrestee is jailed without the possibility of bail and will 
only be released upon his giving of a DNA sample.70  When the cheek 
swab is performed, the technician seizing the DNA must record the date 
and time of the sample, the name of the person taking the sample, the 
name and address of the arrestee, and the offense for the arrest.71  This 
information stays with the sample throughout its existence.72  After the 
DNA sample has been seized, it is then sent to the appropriate laboratory 
facility for analysis and testing.73  The physical DNA sample is stored in 
 
or affray on a firefighter, an emergency medical technician, medical responder, 
emergency department nurse, or emergency department physician; . . . Assault 
inflicting serious injury on a law enforcement, probation, or parole officer or 
on a person employed at a State or local detention facility.  Any offense in Ar-
ticle 10, Kidnapping and Abduction, or Article 10A, Human Traffick-
ing. . . . First and second degree burglary . . . Breaking out of dwelling house 
burglary . . . Breaking or entering a place of religious worship . . . burglary with 
explosives. . . . Any offense in Article 15, Arson. . . . Armed robbery. . . . Any 
offense which would require the person to register under the provisions of Ar-
ticle 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes, Sex Offender and Public Pro-
tection Registration Programs. . . . Cyberstalking. . . . [And] stalking. 
Id.  Additionally, any person arrested for attempting, solicitation of another to commit, 
conspiracy to commit, or aiding and abetting another to commit, any of the violations 
listed above must provide a DNA sample.  Id. § 15A-266.3A(g).  H.B. 483 (2011) sought 
to expand the list of felonies for which a DNA sample would be taken at arrest.  The bill 
passed the House and was sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Judiciary 
Committee and never heard. 
 68. Id. § 15A-266.3A(b). 
 69. Id. § 15A-534(a).  The Act states, “the judicial official shall make the collection of 
the fingerprints or DNA sample a condition of pretrial release” if the arrestee refuses to 
provide a DNA sample.  Id. (emphasis added).  In theory, an arrestee—a presumptively 
innocent person—could be jailed indefinitely if he refuses to provide a DNA sample. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § 15A-266.3A(c). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 15A-266.3A(b). 
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the Databank, and the DNA record is stored in the Database, as well as 
in CODIS.74 
After the arrestee’s DNA sample is seized, the arrestee is then pro-
vided a written notice of the procedures required to be taken in order to 
have his DNA sample and record expunged.75  Expunction is warranted 
only in certain circumstances.76  Within thirty days of the occurrence of 
one of the expunction-qualifying events, the District Attorney must veri-
fy that one of the qualifying events has actually occurred and supply that 
information on a form to be submitted to the SBI.77  Within thirty days of 
receipt of the form, the SBI must verify that the DNA sample and record 
are not required to be in the Database and Databank based on another 
statute and then must remove the record and the samples.78  After the 
removal of the record and the samples, the SBI must mail the arrestee a 
verification form indicating that his DNA record and sample have been 
expunged.79  If for whatever reason there is a denial of the expunction or 
a failure to act on time by either the SBI or the District Attorney, the ar-
restee can file a motion with the court to review the denial of the ex-
punction.80 
During the entire time the arrestee’s DNA is in the possession of the 
government, his DNA is being checked against DNA samples from crime 
scenes and run in the state Database and in the CODIS database.81  This 
perpetual search continues even while the arrestee navigates through the 
bureaucratic red tape of the expunction process.  During this period, 
even though the arrestee no longer has any reason to be in the DNA da-
tabase, and is technically an innocent person, his DNA is still being 
searched.82  The arrestee has not been convicted of any of the enume-
 
 74. Id. § 15A-266.3. 
 75. Id. § 15A-266.3A(d). 
 76. Id. § 15A-266.3A(h)–(j).  An arrestee’s DNA record and sample are eligible for 
expunction only if the arrestee’s charges are dismissed, he is acquitted, or if he is con-
victed of a lesser included misdemeanor offense.  Id.  Additionally, DNA can be ex-
punged if no charge has been filed within the statute of limitations, or if there is no con-
viction within three years of the arrest and there is no ongoing prosecution during those 
three years.  Id.  Also, an expunction will only be warranted if no other law requires the 
sample or record to exist.  Id. 
 77. Id. § 15A-266.3A(j). 
 78. Id. § 15A-266.3A(k). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. § 15A-266.3A(l). 
 81. See Combined DNA Index System, supra note 49. 
 82. It is notable that in 2008, the European Court of Human Rights ruled unanim-
ously that the retention of the DNA of innocent persons by the UK violated human rights 
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rated crimes, yet the State still allows the continual warrantless search of 
his DNA in CODIS. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
The DNA Database Act of 2010 expressly permits law enforcement 
to compel an arrestee to provide a DNA sample despite not having a 
warrant or probable cause to believe that the DNA sample will provide 
relevant evidence of the crime for which the arrestee was taken into cus-
tody.  In addition to the warrantless search and seizure, mandatory DNA 
testing violates an individual’s right to information privacy guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment.83  Basic Fourth Amendment principles pro-
hibit warrantless searches and seizures of DNA samples from individuals 
arrested for certain offenses.  These arrestees have not yet been con-
victed of any crime, and accordingly still enjoy an expectation of privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment states, “The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”84  This Comment ana-
lyzes this constitutional provision by examining first whether the gov-
ernment action constitutes a search, and after concluding that it is, the 
Comment then examines whether that search is unreasonable.  Analysis 
of these prongs indicates that the DNA Database Act of 2010 is an unrea-
sonable search and seizure, and is therefore unconstitutional. 
A.  Is it a Search? 
A search exists when the government intrudes upon a person’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.85  As a corollary, when the defendant 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, there has been no 
search that will implicate the Fourth Amendment.  Though the Court 
has declined to provide a bright line rule for whether a person has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, it has stated that the Fourth Amendment 
 
law.  S. & Marper v. The United Kingdom, 1581 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581.html. 
 83. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 128 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The Fourth Amendment protects privacy.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy.”). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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“protects people, not places.”86  In so stating, the Court established the 
important distinction between what “a person knowingly exposes to the 
public”87 and the “uninvited ear.”88   
The Court in Katz v. United States made this distinction where the 
defendant’s conversation in a phone booth was recorded and the Court 
ruled that the recording of the conversation was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.89  The Court’s distinction between the “intruding 
eyes” of people who saw the defendant in the phone booth and the “un-
invited ear” is an important one.  There is no Fourth Amendment protec-
tion in the presence in the phone booth, but the protection instead lies in 
the contents of the private discussion.90 
Since Katz, subsequent cases have adopted a two-step inquiry of 
whether something classifies as a search: “whether the defendant exhi-
bited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”91 and whether that 
expectation was “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasona-
ble.”92  Given this understanding of Fourth Amendment protections and 
reasonable expectations of privacy, it is well settled that the seizure and 
ensuing analysis of DNA samples implicates the Fourth Amendment.93 
Before analyzing whether there is a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy that a person has in his own DNA, there must first be a distinction 
made similar to the one made in Katz—between presence and content.  
It is not uncommon to expose the general public to DNA, whether it be 
saliva from drinking, eating, or spitting, or from hair and skin cells that 
simply fall off the body.  These exposures of DNA to the general public 
are akin to being seen standing in the phone booth.  Intruding eyes can 
readily see a person standing there just like a DNA sample can be taken 
from a drinking glass or discarded cigarette.  However, when the con-
tents of that DNA are exposed, just like eavesdropping on a conversa-
tion, the reasonable expectation of privacy is present.  As discussed in 
this Comment, DNA contains a variety of sensitive information that 
people expect to remain private.  When that privacy is intruded upon, 
 
 86. Id. at 351. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 352. 
 89. Id. at 359. 
 90. Id. at 354–59. 
 91. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 v. Ac-
ton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 
(1989). 
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the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is implicated, and the 
Fourth Amendment will be triggered.94 
Having established this distinction, the inquiry begins with whether 
an arrestee has a subjective expectation of privacy in his cheek cells.  
People can easily understand the private nature of DNA, and thanks to 
television shows such as CSI and Law & Order, many are aware of its 
use as a powerful tool in law enforcement and investigation.95  In ex-
amining this prong, the Court asks “whether [the person] has shown 
that ‘he [sought] to preserve [something] as private.’”96  In Cupp v. Mur-
phy, the Court found that a defendant had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the dirt underneath his fingernails.97  Given the expectation of 
privacy in something that mundane, it is certainly not a stretch of the 
imagination to believe that people wish to keep their genetic makeup, 
medical history, predispositions for diseases, and other sensitive, highly-
personal subjects private. 
The next question is whether there is an objective expectation of 
privacy in an arrestee’s DNA.  Here, such an objective expectation of pri-
vacy does exist.  In Schmerber, the Court states, “The interests in human 
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any 
such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be ob-
tained.”98  As discussed throughout this Comment, there are significant 
implications of a person’s dignity and privacy through the seizure and 
search of DNA, and the power of the information that can be exposed 
through those searched makes that interest even more compelling.  Ad-
ditionally, the purpose of the search is to uncover evidence of past 
crimes and solve cold cases.  Though these reasons are certainly compel-
ling, the mere chance that evidence could be obtained is an impermissi-
 
 94. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
 95. Strengthening Forensic Science Oversight, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20055 (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).  
The article states: 
  According to the National Academy of Sciences, most Americans believe 
that forensic science practices are comparable to the flawlessly executed proce-
dures seen on television programs such as CSI and Law & Order.  While it is 
true that forensic investigative techniques have largely benefited the criminal 
justice system, some troubling deficiencies have emerged. 
Id. 
 96. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 
 97. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1978). 
 98. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966). 
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ble purpose.99  With these considerations, there is certainly an objective 
expectation of privacy in one’s DNA. 
The actual seizure and searches of the DNA are numerous.  The tak-
ing of a DNA sample “plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”100  Additionally, a 
separate search occurs after the government sends the DNA sample to an 
SBI lab for testing.  There, the physical sample is analyzed and the genet-
ic profile is generated.  “Such testing procedures plainly constitute 
searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon seizures of ‘per-
sons,’ within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment.”101  A third 
search occurs when the DNA profile is uploaded into CODIS and then 
compared against other DNA samples in the Database.102  Lastly, subse-
quent searches occur when the DNA is subjected to continuous searches 
after its initial addition to the Database.  The Database is searched on a 
weekly basis for matches to new profiles,103 with this weekly search po-
tentially exposing the DNA to an infinite number of warrantless 
searches. 
There is no question that the taking of a person’s DNA and conti-
nuous and constant analysis of that DNA constitutes a search and sei-
zure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Because the search 
and analysis is considered a search and seizure, it is entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protections.  In order for the search and seizure not to run 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the search and seizure must be reason-
able. 
B.  Is it an Unreasonable Search and Seizure? 
In addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, the default 
rule is, “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”104  If there is some justification, then the 
 
 99. Id. at 769–70 (“The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth 
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evi-
dence might be obtained.”). 
 100. Id. at 767. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“The ensuing 
chemical analysis of the sample . . . is a further invasion of the . . . privacy interests.”). 
 103. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, supra note 41. 
 104. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
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scope of the permissible warrantless activity by the police will be deter-
mined by that justification.105  When the government exceeds the scope 
determined by the justification, the default rule returns.106  There are 
several exceptions by which North Carolina may seek to justify the Act, 
but ultimately, each exception is inapplicable and the Act should be held 
unconstitutional. 
1.  Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest 
As stated previously, the default rule is that warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable, so the burden is on the government to demonstrate 
some particular justification for dispensing with the warrant require-
ment.  One such justification is the search incident to a lawful arrest.  
North Carolina’s DNA Database Act of 2010 involves a search incident to 
a lawful arrest, one of the traditionally recognized exceptions to the war-
rant requirement.107 
The Court in United States v. Robinson examined the constitutionali-
ty of the warrantless search incident to arrest.108  The Court there stated 
that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search incident to a 
lawful arrest only when the justifications of officer safety and preserva-
tion of the evidence are present.109  These two justifications are often 
 
 105. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 268–69 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).  Justice Marshall explained: 
  The only need for a search in this case was to disarm petitioner . . . . The 
search conducted by Officer Smith went far beyond what was reasonably neces-
sary to achieve that end.  It therefore fell outside the scope of . . . [the] excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 
Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
 108. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 109. Id. at 230–234; see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339, (2009).  The Court 
in Gant indicated: 
[A] search incident to arrest may only include the arrestee’s person and the 
area within his immediate control—construing that phrase to mean the area 
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence.  That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the excep-
tion, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with 
its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of 
the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. . . . [S]earches 
incident to arrest are reasonable in order to remove any weapons the arrestee 
might seek to use and in order to prevent the concealment or destruction of 
evidence . . . .  If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the 
18
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implicated in arrest situations, and the scope of this warrantless search is 
limited to the person and anything in that person’s immediate control. 
110 
In order for the Act to classify as a search incident to a lawful arrest, 
the concerns giving rise to this exception to the warrant requirement 
must be present.111  According to the Robinson rationale, the only justifi-
cations for a warrantless search and seizure at arrest are officer safety 
and the threat of the destruction of evidence.112  These justifications have 
no application to the extraction and analysis of DNA.  Neither saliva 
from the cheek of an arrestee, nor the arrestee’s DNA, are harmful to the 
arresting officer, and no stretch of the imagination can fathom a single 
scenario in which they would be.  The justification of officer safety is ir-
relevant here.  Additionally, no threat of destruction of the DNA evi-
dence exists at the time of the arrest.113  DNA is something that is with a 
person his entire life, and it will not change.  Also, the government still 
has access to the DNA of individuals upon conviction.  There is simply 
no justification for shifting the timetable forward because the DNA evi-
dence will never be destroyed. 
 
area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  These justifications are generally applicable and police are 
not required to make these showings each time they perform a search incident to arrest.  
Id. 
 110. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 230–34; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 111. The search incident to a lawful arrest exception comes from Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218.  In that case, Robinson was arrested for operating an automobile without a valid 
permit, and at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer frisked Robinson, discovering a 
crumpled cigarette package containing heroin.  Id. at 220–23.  The Supreme Court 
upheld the warrantless search and seizure and allowed the search incident to arrest based 
on two justifications—the threat to the safety of the arresting officer, and the threat of 
the destruction of the evidence.  Id. at 219–24. 
 112. Id. at 226.  The Court quoted Chimel, saying: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to 
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety 
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is en-
tirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence 
on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 
Id. at 226 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–763). 
 113. Or even at any time after the arrest. 
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The Robinson line of cases dealt with the search incident to arrest of 
a person or of the person’s home and immediate surroundings.114  As re-
cently as 2009, the Court continued to recognize the search incident to 
lawful arrest as a legitimate justification for dispensing with the warrant 
requirement.  In Arizona v. Gant, the Court considered the exception’s 
application to the warrantless seizure and search of vehicles and effects, 
and reiterated that the two justifications for a search incident to a lawful 
arrest are officer safety and evidence preservation.115 
In Gant, the Court maintained its restriction on a search of a car in-
cident to arrest and stated that a search incident to arrest is only lawful 
to the extent that it is done to protect officer safety or to prevent the de-
struction of evidence.116  As mentioned previously, neither justification 
applies here.  Perhaps even more notably, the Gant rule arose from the 
search of a car—an area where our expectations of privacy are lowest.117 
Without Gant’s limitation on the search of a vehicle incident to ar-
rest, law enforcement would be allowed to search every car upon the ar-
rest of a driver.  Under this Orwellian police privilege, there is no doubt 
police would uncover large amounts of drugs and other contraband; 
however, the Fourth Amendment does not allow these unfettered 
searches.  The search of an arrestee’s car without the justifications of of-
ficer safety or evidence preservation “would serve no purpose except to 
provide a police entitlement, and it is an anathema to the Fourth 
Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis.”118 
Gant can be viewed as a restriction of the search incident to lawful 
arrest exception.  The cases considering the exception prior to Gant op-
erated under a sort of legal fiction: that arrestees who are not left in their 
cars can still injure an officer or destroy evidence.  While operating un-
der this premise, the Court in New York v. Belton extended the allowance 
 
 114. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981); Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
 115. Gant, 556 U.S. at 332.  The Court hinted at a third justification, which will be 
discussed later in this Comment. 
 116. Gant, 556 U.S. at 339–43.  Gant had been arrested for driving with a suspended 
license, and was then handcuffed and locked in the back of a police car while the arrest-
ing officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the car.  Id. at 335.  The govern-
ment attempted to justify the search of the car as a search incident to arrest, but the 
Court denied the exception’s application to Gant because neither of the two traditional 
justifications for a search incident to arrest were present.  Id. at 344–45. 
 117. This is a well-established assumption.  Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 
(1999) (“Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with 
regard to the property that they transport in cars.”). 
 118. Gant, 556 U.S. at 347. 
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of California v. Chimel that permitted a search of the grab area in a ve-
hicle after the driver’s arrest.119  This allowance was based on the protec-
tion of officer safety and the preservation of evidence.120  In Gant, the 
Court recognized that arrestees are not left in their cars during an arrest 
and have no way to injury an officer or destroy evidence.121  Thus, the 
Court significantly restricted the exception that was expanded in Belton, 
and held that search of a vehicle incident to arrest is only permissible 
when the occupant is not secured and is within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment.122 
Gant can also be viewed as an expansion of the search incident to 
arrest exception in that it creates a third justification.  The Court in Gant 
stated that there are some circumstances completely unique to the ve-
hicle context that justify a search incident to lawful arrest when it is rea-
sonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle.123  In Gant, the Court clearly indicated that law en-
forcement may dispense with the warrant requirement for the purpose of 
collection of the evidence, but only when it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence of that crime leading to the arrest might be found.124  In citing 
this third justification for a search incident to lawful arrest, Justice Ste-
vens, the author of the Gant opinion, cited Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Thornton v. United States.125  In Thornton, whose rationale was 
later applied to Gant, Justice Scalia opined, “there is nothing irrational 
about broader police authority to search for evidence when and where 
the perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested.  The fact of prior lawful 
arrest distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and distinguishes a 
search of evidence of his crime from general rummaging.”126  All of this 
was based on the idea that evidence of a crime is more likely to be found 
where the suspect was actually apprehended.  Through this third justifi-
cation, a limited warrantless search for evidence of the crime for which 
the arrestee was arrested is allowed, but only at arrest. 
While it may seem that this justification will allow the search and 
seizure of DNA from arrestees as evidence of the crime for which they 
 
 119. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
 120. Id. at 464 (“The Chimel exception to the warrant requirement was designed with 
two principal concerns in mind: the safety of the arresting officer and the preservation of 
easily concealed or destructible evidence.”). 
 121. Gant, 556 U.S. at 341–44. 
 122. Id. at 351. 
 123. Id. at 345–47. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 342–49. 
 126. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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were arrested, it will not stand.  Based on the government’s justification 
of solving past crimes, it is an incredibly difficult argument to make that 
the evidence for a present crime will reveal the perpetrator of a past 
crime.  Simply because a person has been arrested for one crime does not 
mean the person has committed the past crimes.  Additionally, under the 
justification from Gant, DNA collection is unlikely to yield evidence of 
many crimes for which some arrestees are arrested.  For example, how 
can DNA be useful evidence in crimes of cyberstalking?127  The mere 
chance that evidence of prior crimes might be obtained is not sufficient 
to justify DNA extraction.  “The interests in human dignity and privacy 
which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the 
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”128  The govern-
ment’s purported justification that the Act will provide evidence to solve 
past crimes is unrealistic. 
If the Fourth Amendment does not allow a warrantless intrusion in-
cident to arrest into our cars where we enjoy the lowest expectations of 
privacy, the Fourth Amendment certainly should not permit the gov-
ernment to forcibly intrude into our bodies without a warrant and with-
out probable cause to search and seize our genetic blueprint.  North 
Carolina’s allowance of searches and seizures of DNA incident to arrest, 
based on a rationale that does not even allow a search incident to arrest 
of a car, is unreasonable, unjustifiable, and untenable.129 
2.  Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from intruding 
into the body of an arrestee in order to seize a biological sample unless 
they have either a warrant to do so, or both probable cause to believe the 
sample will provide evidence of the crime and exigent circumstances ex-
ist that make obtaining a warrant impracticable.130  Because the DNA Da-
 
 127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(f)(10) (2011). 
 128. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). 
 129. It should be noted that eventually law enforcement will obtain the arrestee’s 
DNA.  Under the previous version of the law, law enforcement would be entitled to seize 
and continuously search the arrestee’s DNA upon his conviction of one of the enume-
rated crimes.  The constitutionality of this is not in question.  Thus, we are not dealing 
with a case of whether the government will get the DNA, but instead when the govern-
ment will get the DNA.  Additionally, law enforcement may have access to an arrestee’s 
DNA upon a showing of probable cause and a warrant.  The constitutionality of this is 
not in question either. 
 130. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769–70.  The Court indicated: 
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence 
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tabase Act of 2010 amounts to a warrantless search and seizure, one 
possible way the warrantless intrusion could be permitted is if both suf-
ficient probable cause and exigent circumstances exist that allow for dis-
pensing with the warrant requirement.  An application of this exception 
to the Act demonstrates that because there is no probable cause to search 
and seize the arrestee’s DNA, nor are exigent circumstances present, the 
warrantless and suspicionless search and seizure of an arrestee’s DNA 
violates the Fourth Amendment.131 
In Schmerber v. California, the Court explained the role of the 
Fourth Amendment when a state directs that biological samples be 
seized and searched.132  In that case, the defendant was hospitalized after 
being involved in a traffic collision while driving under the influence of 
alcohol.133  The officer at the scene of the wreck noted the smell of alco-
hol and other symptoms of drunkenness.134  After the defendant was 
admitted to the hospital where he received treatment, the officer placed 
him under arrest and ordered a physician to collect a blood sample, de-
spite a lack of consent.135  The ensuing chemical analysis performed on 
the blood sample confirmed that the defendant had been driving under 
the influence of alcohol.136  The blood test was admitted in court, and 
the defendant was convicted.137 
The Court considered the question of “whether the chemical analy-
sis introduced in evidence in this case should have been excluded as the 
product of an unconstitutional search and seizure.”138  In answering this 
 
might be obtained.  In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evi-
dence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to 
suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate 
search. 
Id. 
 131. It should be noted that “whether or not a search is reasonable within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment . . . . has never depended on the law of the particular state 
in which the search occurs.”  Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (citations 
omitted).  Additionally, a state cannot legislate away the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions.  Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967) (“Just as search authorized by state 
law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment . . . .”).  Accordingly, the mere 
fact that the North Carolina legislature has authorized this search and seizure carries no 
weight in the balancing test. 
 132. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. 
 133. Id. at 759. 
 134. Id. at 769. 
 135. Id. at 758. 
 136. Id. at 759. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 766–67. 
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question, the Court explained that “the Fourth Amendment’s proper 
function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against 
intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are 
made in an improper manner.”139  Essentially, if the police are justified in 
requiring the defendant to submit to the blood test, then it will be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.  That justification comes from 
the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances because the 
seizure was performed without a warrant. 
State intrusions into the human body are distinct from state interfe-
rences with property relationships or private papers.140  As such, the tra-
ditional rules applying to searches and seizures of papers are not instruc-
tive in the context of a physical intrusion into the body.141  According to 
the Court in Schmerber, the Fourth Amendment is a bar against intru-
sions into the human body that are made in an improper manner.142  Es-
sentially, when confronted with a physical intrusion into the body, the 
police must be justified in their actions, and the means and procedure 
employed by them must conform to Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.143 
The Schmerber principle controls in an analysis of the DNA Data-
base Act of 2010.  The principle is that “establishing probable cause to 
arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological specimen 
to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant.”144  
Exigent circumstances must also exist that will make obtaining a warrant 
impracticable.145 
Proponents of the Act argue that the statute itself satisfies the prob-
able cause requirement because the DNA sample will not be taken with-
 
 139. Id. at 768. 
 140. Id. at 767–68. 
 141. Id. at 768 (“Limitations on the kinds of property which may be seized under war-
rant, as distinct from the procedures for search and the permissible scope of search, are 
not instructive in this context.”). 
 142. Id. at 768. 
 143. Id.  Ultimately, both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed to allow 
the warrantless search and seizure.  Id. at 770–71.  The probable cause was the odor of 
alcohol and the defendant’s drunken state.  Id. at 768–69.  The exigent circumstances 
present to make obtaining a warrant impracticable were the disappearance of alcohol in 
the blood as time passed.  Id. at 770 (“[T]he delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under 
the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence.”).  Despite this outcome, the 
principle nevertheless controls the analysis here. 
 144. In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn. 2006). 
 145. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769. 
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/6
CROOK-FINAL 3/23/2012  2:36 PM 
2012] SACRIFICING LIBERTY FOR SECURITY 497 
out a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.146  This argument is 
flawed because probable cause to support a criminal charge is not equiv-
alent to probable cause to issue a search warrant.147 
The Act impermissibly uses a judicial determination of probable 
cause for the arrest as a substitute for the probable cause required to is-
sue a search warrant.  But, just as in Schmerber, no such dual use of 
probable cause is permissible.  Probable cause to arrest is not sufficient 
to intrude into the body without a warrant.  In Schmerber, the probable 
cause to seize the blood sample arose from the officer’s belief that it 
would reasonably produce evidence related to the crime for which the 
defendant was arrested.148  The fact that a magistrate has determined 
probable cause exists for the individual to be arrested does not signify 
that the magistrate has also determined that there is a fair probability 
that evidence of the crime will be found in the biological specimen taken 
from the defendant.149  These two determinations are distinct.150 
 
 146. This sort of argument is found throughout the committee hearings on the bill, 
but these arguments misunderstand what the magistrate is determining.  See generally 
Audio recording: North Carolina House Judiciary I Committee Meeting (June 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (June 1, 2010)] (on file 
with author).  The magistrate determines whether there was sufficient probable cause to 
arrest, not whether there is probable cause to take the arrestee’s DNA and subject it to a 
continuous search for links to past crimes for which the arrestee has not been arrested. 
 147. State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003) (holding that probable cause 
to support a criminal charge exists when “the evidence worthy of consideration brings 
the charge against the prisoner within reasonable probability”) (citations omitted); see 
also State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995) (holding that probable cause to 
issue a search warrant exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”) 
(citations omitted). 
 148. Justice Brennan observed that: 
The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that 
he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence.  We 
are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly 
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.  Par-
ticularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused 
to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to 
seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-604(a) (2011) (“The judge must examine each 
criminal process or magistrate’s order and determine whether each charge against the 
defendant charges a criminal offense within the original jurisdiction of the superior 
court.”), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A‑ 245 (describing the requirements for a search war-
rant). 
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The Act is applied indiscriminately to all of the enumerated crimes, 
regardless of whether DNA evidence is relevant to the crime charged.  
The mere chance that the desired evidence might be obtained with a 
search is not sufficient to support probable cause for a search.151 
The Act dispenses with the requirement that law enforcement must 
obtain a warrant prior to a search or seizure.152  Under the Act, it is un-
necessary to consider whether the DNA sample will relate to the charged 
crime or to any other criminal activity.  For example, an individual 
could be arrested for a crime in which DNA plays no role, but his DNA 
will still be sampled under the Act.153  While there may be probable 
cause for the arrest, there is no probable cause to take the DNA incident 
to the arrest.  In this situation, there would be no possibility, nor any 
probable cause to believe, that the DNA could reveal evidence related to 
the crime committed.  If such probable cause did exist—probable cause 
that the DNA would provide evidence of the person who committed the 
crime for which the arrestee is in custody—law enforcement would be 
free to obtain a warrant. 
Because there is no probable cause, the question of exigent circums-
tances is inapplicable.  Even if probable cause existed, there still would 
be no exigency because DNA is immutable.154  As in Schmerber, there is 
no threat of destruction of the evidence.  The Act authorizes a search 
and seizure without probable cause or any sort of reasonable suspicion.  
Such an authorization certainly should not pass constitutional muster. 
In sum, because there is no probable cause to search and seize the 
DNA for evidence relating to crimes for which the arrestee has not been 
arrested, and there are not exigent circumstances that may permit the 
unwarranted search and seizure, the Act should be viewed as an uncons-
titutional search and seizure.  Schmerber can be analogized to the North 
Carolina DNA Database Act of 2010 because both Schmerber and the Act 
address the warrantless search and seizure of bodily material upon arrest 
for a crime.  Given their factual similarities, the principles dictating the 
outcome of Schmerber should control an analysis of the DNA Database 
 
 150. Each is subject to different determinations and is addressed in different sections 
of the North Carolina statutes. 
 151. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
 152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A‑ 266.3A(b)) (“The arresting law enforcement officer shall 
obtain, or cause to be obtained, a DNA sample from an arrested person at the time of ar-
rest, or when fingerprinted.”). 
 153. There is no requirement that the crime for which the person is arrested have a 
possibility of DNA evidence being involved.  For a list of crimes triggering DNA collec-
tion, see supra note 67. 
 154. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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Act of 2010.  Thus, mandatory arrestee DNA sampling should be ruled 
unconstitutional under Schmerber. 
3.  Special Needs 
In a number of circumstances, the Supreme Court has allowed 
searches in the absence of probable cause or even individualized suspi-
cion.155  The Court’s allowance of these searches predicates on the 
search’s special needs justification for something other than detecting 
crime and stopping criminals.156  Proponents of the Act cite this special 
needs exception to justify the collection of the DNA; however, the spe-
cial needs exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable to this 
Act. 
In order for a special needs search to pass Fourth Amendment scru-
tiny, it must be unrelated to traditional law enforcement because of the 
balancing test imposed by the Court.157  Under this balancing test, spe-
cial needs searches are permissible where the government interests and 
the effectiveness of the government activity outweigh the intrusion into 
personal privacy and the individual.158  The Court has never found a 
special needs search which furthers traditional law enforcement goals 
that balances correctly.159  The Court has allowed these suspicionless 
 
 155. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (“Although we usually require 
that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by probable 
cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), we have permitted exceptions when 
‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 156. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (2001) (“[I]f there was a 
proper governmental purpose other than law enforcement, there was a ‘special need,’ and 
the Fourth Amendment then required the familiar balancing between that interest and 
the individual’s privacy interest.” (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 325 (1997) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting))). 
 157. Id. at 78; Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313–14 (stating that “to be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing [but that] particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes war-
ranted based on special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement”); Griffin, 
483 U.S. at 873; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (random 
drug testing of student-athletes); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989) (drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer or pro-
motion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
(drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to be 
in violation of particular safety regulations). 
 158. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652–53; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 489 U.S. at 
665. 
 159. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652–53. 
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special needs searches for automobiles160 and in some school situa-
tions,161 with the most common special needs searches being security 
searches at airports and courthouses. 
In upholding various forms of DNA collection laws, federal courts 
have turned to the special needs exception.  Federal courts have upheld 
statutes authorizing warrantless DNA searches and seizures from indi-
viduals on supervised release,162 parolees,163 and convicted felons.164  
Though these cases may seem compelling, each case turns on the status 
of the offender.  Because the person has been convicted, was a parolee, 
or somehow had his rights previously restricted, the individual had a re-
duced expectation of privacy.  An arrestee’s status as an arrestee—
someone presumed innocent until proven guilty—does not reduce his 
expectation of privacy; the expectation of privacy of an arrestee is the 
same as a non-convicted person.  In other cases, it was the status as a 
convicted person and the correlating lower expectation of privacy that 
allowed the government’s interests to weigh more heavily and justify the 
special need necessary to subject that person to the suspicionless search 
and seizure of their DNA.165  No such special status exists here. 
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court examined the special 
needs exception in holding a particular law unconstitutional.166  In that 
case, the issue presented was “whether the interest in using the threat of 
criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine can jus-
tify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual 
search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant.”167  To 
answer this question, the Court applied the special needs exception to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.168  Under the special 
 
 160. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that random stops 
of automobiles for generalized crime fighting are impermissible without reasonable sus-
picion, but fixed checkpoints for DWI or drivers’ licenses are acceptable). 
 161. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (limiting the 
scope of permissible searches); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding 
student drug testing policy); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (noting that schools may also re-
quire neutral drug tests for extracurricular activities); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 
(1985) (holding that a school official may search individual students if he has reasonable 
suspicion the student is violating a school rule). 
 162. United States v. Lujan, 504 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 163. Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2006); Miller v. Parole 
Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 164. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 165. E.g., id. 
 166. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 76. 
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needs exception, “a search unsupported by either warrant or probable 
cause can be constitutional when ‘special needs’ other than the normal 
need for law enforcement provide sufficient justification.”169  The Court 
will only apply the special needs exception “[I]f there is a proper go-
vernmental purpose other than law enforcement.”170  The Ferguson Court 
held that because the primary purpose of the law was to use prosecution 
to force women into treatment, and because of the extensive involve-
ment of law enforcement in each state of the policy, the law did not fall 
within the special needs exception.171  There is no comparable special 
need to justify the warrantless search and seizure of an arrestee’s DNA. 
Under the DNA Database Act of 2010, the primary purpose of the 
expanded DNA database is to solve crimes—a law enforcement pur-
pose.172  The entire legislative history of the Act focuses on law enforce-
ment and solving unsolved crimes.173  Throughout the legislative debates 
and committee hearings on this Act, proponents cited the necessity of 
this Act in solving past crimes, unlocking cold cases, preventing recidiv-
ism of violent offenders, preventing crimes, and reducing investigatory 
costs.174  Many proponents of the Act invoked stories of past violent 
crimes that would have purportedly been prevented by this Act.175  Each 
of these factors unequivocally demonstrate that the Act’s relation to law 
enforcement was the dominant, if not the only, factor that determined its 
passage.  The Act is inextricably related to law enforcement and serves 
the needs of law enforcement.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit recognized in a dissent the obvious problem in at-
tempting to apply the special needs justification to DNA acts: 
  The unequivocal purpose of the searches performed pursuant to the 
DNA Act is to generate the sort of ordinary investigatory evidence used 
by law enforcement officials for everyday law enforcement purposes. . . . 
[I]n passing the DNA Act, Congress’s primary concern was the swift and 
accurate solution and prosecution of crimes as a general matter.  The 
legislative history is littered with approving references to DNA evi-
dence’s ability to solve past and future crimes and thereby assist prosecu-
tions.  See, e.g., DNA Act House Report, at 8–11, 23–27, 32–36 (2000).  
 
 169. Id. at 76 n.7. 
 170. Id. at 81 n.18. 
 171. Id. at 76. 
 172. Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 2010), supra note 18. 
 173. These topics were heartily discussed in all committee hearings. 
 174. See, e.g., Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 2010), supra 
note 18 (statement of Rep. Wil Neumann). 
 175. Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (June 1, 2010), supra note 146 
(statements of Karen Foster and Joan Berry of the Surviving Parents Coalition). 
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For example, the Department of Justice argued to Congress that “one of 
the underlying concepts behind CODIS is to create a database of con-
victed offender profiles and use it to solve crimes for which there are no 
suspects.” Id. at 27.  Members of Congress made similar arguments.  See 
146 CONG. REC. S11645-02, at S11647 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (ar-
guing that the purpose of adding DNA profiles into CODIS is to “solve 
crimes and prevent further crimes”) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 146 
CONG. REC. H8572-02, at H8575-6 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (statement 
of Rep. Canady) (“The purpose of [CODIS] is to match DNA samples 
from crime scenes where there are no suspects with the DNA of con-
victed offenders.  Clearly, the more samples we have in the system, the 
greater the likelihood we will come up with matches and solve cas-
es.”).176 
There is no doubt that the North Carolina Act has a purely law en-
forcement purpose.  Applying the special needs justification of Ferguson, 
law enforcement purposes do not constitute special needs for a warrant-
less search and seizure.  Because the cited needs here are for law en-
forcement, the special needs justification is inapplicable to the Act. 
4.  Balancing Test 
Even if a court were to accept an argument that the Act fits the spe-
cial needs exception—despite its prohibited application to the needs of 
law enforcement—the Act should still be held unconstitutional.  “When 
special needs . . . are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment in-
trusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining 
closely the competing private and public interests.”177  After an examina-
tion of the competing privacy and public interests, the Act should still 
fail because an arrestee’s interests in bodily integrity and genetic privacy 
greatly outweigh any legitimate government interest in seizing and 
searching DNA. 
In examining the constitutionality of DNA testing of convicted fe-
lons, many courts have imposed a balancing test.178  These courts weigh 
the convict’s privacy interests against the government’s need to super-
 
 176. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting).  This case addressed the federal DNA Act, but the same constitutional issues 
are implicated with the North Carolina Act. 
 177. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997); see also Samson v. California, 547 
U.S. 843, 860 (2006). 
 178. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325 (“Under our precedents, if there was a proper govern-
mental purpose other than law enforcement, there was a ‘special need,’ and the Fourth 
Amendment then required the familiar balancing between that interest and the individu-
al’s privacy interest.”). 
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vise, rehabilitate, and control such persons.179  As previously stated, 
when applying the balancing test, courts have found that the govern-
ment’s interests outweigh the privacy interests of the convicts because of 
the convicts’ diminished privacy expectations.180  The constitutionality of 
DNA analysis of convicts is not at issue here.  Instead, we must balance 
the government’s purported interests against the privacy interests of 
people in a free society—people with no diminished expectation of pri-
vacy. 
In upholding Virginia’s collection of arrestee DNA, the Virginia Su-
preme Court applied unsuitable precedent that led to its holding.181  In 
that case, the defendant challenged the collection-at-arrest of his DNA.182  
The Virginia Supreme Court relied on the Fourth Circuit case of Jones v. 
Murray, which examined the collection of DNA at conviction.183  
Though the Virginia court recognized that there is a distinction between 
arrest and conviction, it nevertheless concluded that the collection at ar-
rest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.184  The court focused its dis-
cussion on comparing genetic profiles to fingerprints, but did not ad-
dress the differing privacy interests of arrestees and convicts.185 
An overwhelming distinction exists between the privacy interests of 
someone who has been convicted of a crime and someone who has not 
yet been tried, yet the Virginia Supreme Court and numerous other 
courts have dismissed this critical distinction.186  Depending on an indi-
vidual’s status in the criminal justice system, there are varying degrees of 
privacy.  For example, a detained person awaiting a trial has a dimi-
 
 179. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (considering the state’s need 
to “exercise . . . supervision to assure that [probation] restrictions are in fact observed”).  
In Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of the probationer’s home by 
applying the “special needs” exception.  Id.  The Court justified the departure from the 
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements based upon a “special need” to effec-
tively operate a probation system.  Id.  The Court also found, however, that reasonable 
grounds existed to support the search; therefore, the search of the probationer’s home 
was not completely without suspicion.  Id. 
 180. Id. at 872. 
 181. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007). 
 182. Id. at 704–05. 
 183. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 184. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705 (“While Code [section] 19.2-310.2:1 requires a DNA 
sample after an arrest for specific offenses, as opposed to a conviction, like Code [sec-
tion] 19.2-310.2, it too does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 185. Id. at 705–06. 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011); Myles v. State, 
54 So. 3d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Banks, 790 N.W.2d 526 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2010). 
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nished expectation of privacy,187 but an inmate in a prison cell has no 
expectation of privacy.188  Plainly stated, the Virginia Supreme Court and 
other courts that have upheld similar state statutes have applied unsuit-
able precedent because of the varying expectations of privacy that an in-
dividual enjoys based upon his status in the criminal justice system.  An 
arrestee still has an expectation of privacy, and the compulsory seizure 
and search of his DNA intrudes upon that reasonable expectation. 
Compulsory DNA testing implicates an individual’s interest in bodi-
ly integrity, and arrestees, as well as all other people, have a significant 
interest in their rights to bodily integrity and genetic privacy.  The body 
is entitled to the Fourth Amendment’s strongest protections and it has 
long been recognized that intrusions into the body, like intrusions into 
the home, require more justifications than simple searches of one’s 
clothing or possessions.189  North Carolina should not diminish an arres-
tee’s expectation of privacy based solely on his status as an arrestee be-
cause of the significant need to protect the complex and highly personal 
information contained in a DNA specimen. 
DNA sampling and testing requires a physical intrusion into the 
body.  Each arrestee is compelled to provide a sample, and upon refusal, 
the sample can be taken forcibly, and the arrestee jailed without the abil-
ity to post bond for a potentially indefinite term.190  Ultimately, when the 
sample is taken, the arrestee’s jaw is opened, a swab is forcibly inserted 
into the mouth, and the insides of the mouth are scraped and grinded 
against by the swab until the sampling agent feels the sample has been 
sufficiently taken.  Certainly this type of invasive procedure—both 
physically invasive and informationally invasive—is what the Fourth 
Amendment protects against.  “The overriding function of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusions by the State.”191  Such testing without a warrant, with-
out judicial review, and without probable cause constitutes serious in-
trusions into the interests of personal privacy and dignity. 
There are few areas that are more private, more personal, and more 
likely to implicate individual privacy interests than one’s genetic makeup 
because it contains extensive amounts of information.  A person’s DNA 
is his genetic blueprint.  This blueprint contains every single piece of ge-
netic information about a person, and every year the information that 
 
 187. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 188. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
 189. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-502.1 (2011). 
 191. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 787 (1966). 
32
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/6
CROOK-FINAL 3/23/2012  2:36 PM 
2012] SACRIFICING LIBERTY FOR SECURITY 505 
can be gleaned from a DNA blueprint expands.192  The potential for 
abuse of this personal information is staggering.193 
North Carolina’s Act seeks to make that personal information avail-
able despite the fact that a compulsory seizure of DNA by law enforce-
ment constitutes a serious intrusion into a person’s genetic privacy.  The 
mere collection of the DNA implicates an individual’s interest in his bo-
dily integrity. 
In examining the constitutionality of the law, one’s interests in his 
own privacy must be compared with those legitimate interests advanced 
by the government.194  Only if the government’s purported interests out-
weigh the individual’s interests will the law be upheld as constitution-
al.195  Upon an examination of these government interests, it becomes 
clear that the scales do not tip such that the government’s interest in tak-
ing DNA from arrestees can outweigh the arrestee’s interests in his own 
privacy and dignity. 
The first governmental interest in the seizure of DNA from arrestees 
is that the DNA serves as a sort of identification of the arrestee.196  Pro-
 
 192. One could argue that we only need to consider the technology presently availa-
ble, but this argument is misguided.  The Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to 
consider future technology issues when examining Fourth Amendment concerns.  In 
Kyllo the Court stated, “The rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated sys-
tems that are already in use or in development.”  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 
(2001).  Additionally, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also stated a concern for future 
DNA technology.  Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  In Johnson 
v. Quander, the court stated, in passing, “To be sure, genetic fingerprints differ somewhat 
from their metacarpal brethren, and future technological advances in DNA testing 
(coupled with possible expansions of the DNA Act’s scope) may empower the govern-
ment to conduct wide-ranging ‘DNA dragnets’ that raise justifiable citations to George 
Orwell.”  Id. 
 193. DNA is the master molecule of every cell that serves as a blueprint for how every 
cell in the body is created.  Craig Freudenrich, How DNA Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/life/cellular-microscopic/dna.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2012).  It contains vital information that gets passed on to each successive 
generation of cells and it coordinates the making of itself as well as other molecules.  Id.  
DNA carries all of the information for one’s physical characteristics and contains all ge-
netically predetermined information about a person.  Id.  Even the “junk” DNA which is 
used in DNA testing implicates a wealth of information.  Id.  This junk DNA may contain 
instructions essential for the growth and survival of humans, and may hold keys to un-
derstanding complex diseases like cancer, strokes and heart attacks.  Id. 
 194. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 195. Id. at 312 (1997) (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989)). 
 196. Audio recording: North Carolina House of Representatives Floor Debate on H.B. 
1403 (July 10, 2010) [hereinafter Audio recording: Floor Debate on H.B. 1403] (state-
ment of Rep. Dan W. Ingle) (on file with author). 
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ponents of the Act often draw comparisons between DNA seizures as a 
form of fingerprinting and the requirement that an arrestee have his pic-
ture taken and be fingerprinted during the booking process.197  Accord-
ing to these proponents, the government’s interests in solving crime and 
administrative matters outweigh the arrestee’s right to privacy and bodi-
ly integrity.198  This argument is flawed. 
This argument that DNA serves as a means of identification assigns 
two distinct meanings to the word “identification.”  The first meaning of 
identification is in an administrative context that views DNA testing as a 
method of verifying who the person is and having that identity entered 
into administrative bookkeeping.  The second meaning given to identifi-
cation arises in an investigative setting and views DNA testing as a way 
of seeing what the person has done—whether that person has a criminal 
record and whether that person has committed an unsolved crime.  
While the two definitions of “identification” have totally different mean-
ings, proponents of the law treat them as the same.199  For proponents, 
the analysis of DNA to connect the arrestee to unsolved crimes impli-
cates only an arrestee’s interest in hiding his identity under the first de-
finition, a practically non-existent interest. 
While an arrestee may lack a privacy interest in concealing his 
name and date of birth, he still certainly retains his privacy interest in 
his own bodily integrity, his genetic makeup, and his past actions.  The 
arrestee undoubtedly has a very low interest in concealing his identity 
under the first definition, but the second definition implicates a much 
greater interest.  The dissenting judges in United States v. Kincade identi-
fied this flawed dual usage of the two definitions of identification.200  The 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Recently, a deeply divided Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
upheld the federal DNA collection law after applying a balancing test to the totality of 
the circumstances.  United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011).  The majority 
in this court conflated the two definitions of identification in upholding the law.  Id. at 
398–416.  More recently, in examining a similar California law, the California Court of 
Appeals rejected the reasoning in Mitchell because it failed to distinguish the two types of 
identification.  People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for 
review granted, depublished by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 200. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).  The court in Kincade 
examined the constitutionality of a law requiring individuals who have been convicted of 
certain crimes to be subject to DNA testing for identification purposes.  Id.  The question 
for the court was “whether the Fourth Amendment permits compulsory DNA profiling of 
certain conditionally-released federal offenders in the absence of individualized suspicion 
that they have committed additional crimes.”  Id. at 816. 
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judges rejected the combination of the two definitions of identification 
that proponents of the Act urge.  They wrote:  
  Claiming that DNA profiles are designed to “identify[,]” . . . much 
like fingerprints, is disingenuous.  Kincade, for instance, was identified 
and booked with fingerprints, and his identification was confirmed by a 
criminal conviction before a court of law, long before his DNA sample 
was taken.  The collection of a DNA sample thus does not “identi-
fy” . . . any more than a search of his home does—it merely collects 
more and more information about . . . [him] that can be used to investi-
gate unsolved past or future crimes.201 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently distinguished be-
tween administrative identifications and identifications for other con-
texts.202  Cases in which the distinction between the two definitions of 
“identification” has been upheld demonstrate that the government has a 
legitimate administrative interest in determining who it has in custody, 
but this administrative interest is wholly distinguished from the gov-
ernment’s investigatory interest in determining whether a person has 
committed a crime.  The government’s claim that it is simply seizing the 
DNA for identification purposes is plainly disingenuous; the government 
is only attempting to mask investigation by calling it identification. 
It is also essential to highlight that a common statement is that a 
DNA profile is just like a fingerprint.203  This assertion is neither sup-
 
 201. Id. at 857 n.16 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 202. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001). 
 203. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The collection and 
maintenance of DNA information, while effected through relatively more intrusive pro-
cedures such as blood draws or buccal cheek swabs, in our view plays the same role as 
fingerprinting.”); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185–86 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The 
governmental justification for [DNA] identification, therefore, relies on no argument dif-
ferent in kind from that traditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, 
but with additional force because of the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling 
and matching methods.”); Rise v. State, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (“That the 
gathering of DNA information requires the drawing of blood rather than inking and roll-
ing a person’s fingertips does not elevate the intrusion upon the plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment interests to a level beyond minimal.”); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 33 (Md. 
2004) (“The purpose [of the DNA profile] is akin to that of a fingerprint.”); State v. 
O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 280 (N.J. 2007) (“We harbor no doubt that the taking of a buc-
cal cheek swab is a very minor physical intrusion upon the person . . . . [It] is no more 
intrusive than the fingerprint procedure and the taking of one’s photograph that a person 
must already undergo as part of the normal arrest process.”); State v. Brown, 157 P.3d 
301, 303 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because the procedure that occurred in this case [buccal 
cheek swab] is akin to the fingerprinting of a person in custody, we conclude that the 
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ported by science nor common sense, and “to compare the fingerprinting 
process and the resulting identification information obtained therefrom 
with DNA profiling is pure folly.”204 
To begin, fingerprinting does not trigger Fourth Amendment pro-
tections, nor is it even considered a search,205 but collection of a DNA 
sample does trigger the Amendment’s protections.206  Fingerprinting is a 
relatively non-intrusive matter and the only information gleaned from a 
fingerprint is the unique pattern on the fingerprint.  Conversely, obtain-
ing DNA is a highly disruptive process that not only involves a physical 
intrusion into the body, but also yields a wealth of highly personal in-
formation including a person’s entire genetic blueprint. 
Additionally, DNA samples and the genetic blueprints contained 
therein reveal astoundingly private information regarding genealogy, 
predisposition to over four thousand types of diseases, and arguably ge-
netic markers for numerous traits like aggression, sexual orientation, 
and substance addiction.207  As DNA technology continues to develop, so 
will the information able to be gleaned from a DNA sample.  By compar-
ison, fingerprints only identify the name of the person who left them.  
“The extraction of DNA, then, is much more than a mere progression to 
taking fingerprints and photographs, it represents a quantum leap that is 
entirely unnecessary for identification purposes.”208 
A second governmental interest used in a balancing test is the inter-
est in solving past crimes.209  This generalized interest in solving crime 
simply cannot trump the interests in privacy that an arrestee holds.  
Courts have found that the interest in accurate criminal investigations 
and prosecution outweighs the interests of the individual.210  However, 
while this is the balance that may strike for a convicted person, as men-
tioned above, a free person has a greater expectation of privacy.  The law 
in United States v. Sczubelek, for example, required DNA samples to be 
 
seizure of the defendant’s DNA did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under either 
constitution.”). 
 204. United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 1999). 
 205. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969). 
 206. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767 (1966). 
 207. Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the 
Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 188 (2004). 
 208. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 608–09. 
 209. Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 2010), supra note 18 
(statement of Rep. Wil Neumann). 
 210. See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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collected from “individuals in custody and individuals on release, parole, 
or probation to give a DNA sample if they are, or have been, convicted of 
a qualifying federal offense.”211  This rationale, based on the plaintiff’s 
status as a parolee and the need for intense supervision comes from Sam-
son v. California.212 
Under the North Carolina Act, there is no need for any type of su-
pervision because of the differing expectations of privacy.  There is simp-
ly no compelling reason to unduly burden an arrestee’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. 
A damning blow to North Carolina’s claim that DNA databases help 
solve crime comes from the United Kingdom, where the British system 
provides an accurate telling of the future of the United States and DNA 
testing. 213  Since the United Kingdom enacted a system of mandatory 
DNA analysis of all arrestees in 2004, the British government has added 
4.5 million DNA profiles to its database.214  Of those 4.5 million profiles, 
“[a]s of March 2008, 857,000 people in the British database, or about 
one-fifth, have no current criminal record.”215 
A recent report on the success of the British DNA database revealed 
that putting innocent people in DNA databanks is ineffective in solving 
past crimes.216  Since the inception of the British system of collecting 
 
 211. Id. at 181. 
 212. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 213. It should be noted the United Kingdom’s law was invalidated by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.  S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 
1581 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ 
ECHR/2008/1581.html.  That opinion stated: 
  In conclusion, the Court finds that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of 
the powers of retention of . . . DNA profiles of persons suspected but not con-
victed of offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, fails to strike 
a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that the 
respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this 
regard.  Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate inter-
ference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and cannot be re-
garded as necessary in a democratic society. 
Id. ¶ 125. 
 214. The United Kingdom has a population of 61,000,000. 
 215. Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2009. 
 216. Additionally, it is very troubling that the North Carolina General Assembly was 
aware of the ineffectiveness of DNA testing in solving crimes.  On July 1, 2010, Rep. Paul 
Luebke presented the House Judiciary I committee with an issue brief from the Duke 
University Institute for Genome Science and Policy that explicitly stated, “The usefulness 
of an expanded DNA database for preventing crimes is unknown and poorly docu-
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DNA samples from arrestees, there has “been little evidence as to the sys-
tem’s effectiveness in attaining felony convictions.”217  The Independent 
reports, “According to one recent estimate, less than one per cent of rec-
orded crime is solved using the database.”218  An analysis of the numbers 
from the United States is not available because the FBI does not keep sta-
tistics on the number of matches that lead to convictions, though there 
is no reason to believe the statistics would lead to a different conclusion.  
Given the history of the DNA database in the United Kingdom, expan-
sion of North Carolina’s database to include arrestees will most likely fail 
to increase its efficacy in solving crime. 
Considering the Fourth Amendment’s strict application to intru-
sions into the body and each relevant exception, North Carolina’s DNA 
Database Act of 2010 should not pass constitutional muster.  The Act is 
a warrantless, suspicionless and unreasonable search and seizure.  The 
Fourth Amendment should not permit this physical intrusion into the 
body, seizure of genetic matter, and perpetual search of private genetic 
material containing highly sensitive information. 
5.  No Exceptions 
No exception to the Fourth Amendment will permit the continua-
tion of the DNA Database Act of 2010.  The Act seeks to search and seize 
physical materials and personal information from arrestees without any 
sort of probable cause to justify the search and seizure.  The Act cannot 
be justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest because the search and 
seizure are unrelated to the two justifications giving rise to this excep-
tion.  Nor can the Act be upheld as a special needs exception to the war-
rant requirement because the Act’s primary purpose is law enforcement.  
Lastly, the Act will not survive balancing test inquiry because the inter-
ests a person has in his bodily integrity and informational privacy greatly 
outweigh any governmental interests in identifying his past actions.  
Given each of these reasons, the North Carolina DNA Database Act of 
2010 should be found unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
mented.”  Audio recording: North Carolina House Finance Committee Meeting (July 1, 
2010) (statement of Rep. Paul Luebke) (on file with author). 
 217. Sarah Grantham and Sara Katsanis, Expansion of CODIS to Include Arrestees, 
DUKE INST. FOR GENOME SCI. & POL’Y (2010). 
 218. Bigel Morris, The Big Question: Why is Britain’s DNA Database the Biggest in the 
World, and is it Effective?, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 12, 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-question-why-is-britains-
dna-database-the-biggest-in-the-world-and-is-it-effective-1818878.html. 
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III.  WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
While debating this bill on the final night of the legislative session, 
Representative Kelly M. Alexander, Jr. asked a question at around two 
o’clock in the morning.  He pondered, “Will we be debating a bill one 
day where we incarcerate people before they commit a crime simply be-
cause they carry a trait that will make them have a disposition to antiso-
cial behavior?”219  Representative Kelly understood the significance of 
the DNA Database Act of 2010.  An often-overlooked point, despite its 
major importance, is what exactly the future holds for both DNA tech-
nology and North Carolina’s Act.  Should this Act survive constitutional 
challenges, what will its future forms resemble?  Which crimes will it in-
clude?  Not only that, but how will the Act be expanded, and how will 
law enforcement use the Act?  These issues are of immense concern. 
To begin, there can be no doubt that the Act will expand to cover 
more crimes.  In its present state, the Act is one of the narrower laws 
among the states with similar legislation.  California, for example, col-
lects DNA from all persons who are arrested for any felony, regardless of 
the “seriousness” of the felony, or the felony’s propensity to lead to or be 
connected to other violent crimes.220  Originally, the Act required DNA 
samples to be taken from all persons arrested for any felony, but the list 
of offenses was ultimately shortened.221 
Though the list of crimes was shortened, there remains a desire 
from the North Carolina General Assembly and the North Carolina At-
torney General to add more crimes to the list.222  A co-sponsor of the 
Act, Representative Larry Hall, stated during a committee hearing that 
the drafters had to narrow down the crimes to ones that would likely 
produce hits in the database.  In his words, presently there is simply “not 
enough money to cast a wide net.”223  North Carolina wants to “cast a 
wide net.”  Representative Hall indicated that the drafters only included 
the crimes they felt would produce results—they wanted to include vio-
lent crimes thinking that the perpetrator of one violent crime had likely 
committed others, and hopefully there would be some cold case DNA in 
 
 219. Audio recording: Floor Debate on H.B. 1403, supra note 196 (statement of Rep. 
Kelly M. Alexander, Jr.). 
 220. Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (May 25, 2010), supra note 18, 
(explanation of selected crimes by Hal Pell). 
 221. DNA Database Act of 2010, H.B. 1403 § 1(4), 2009-2010 Sess. (as filed, Apr. 9, 
2009). 
 222. Audio recording: Judiciary I Committee Meeting (June 1, 2010), supra note 146. 
 223. Id. (statement of Rep. Larry D. Hall). 
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the database.224  This reasoning may explain the crimes presently in-
cluded in the Act, but it does not cover the other crimes the legislature 
will include in the future.  In the coming years, the legislature will un-
doubtedly “cast a wide net” to include more crimes, and collect more 
DNA.  North Carolina seeks to collect the DNA of its citizens who are 
presumed innocent, despite not having probable cause to do so. 
Not only are the acts of future legislatures of major concern, but so 
is the future of DNA technology.  The Fourth Amendment protections 
must take into consideration the development of more sophisticated me-
thods of DNA testing and the growing number of uses of DNA.  The Su-
preme Court is sensitive to these changes in technology: “It would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of tech-
nology.”225  We must consider what limits “there are upon this power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”226 
The major advances in DNA technology are too numerous and well 
known to discuss here, but with these advances come questions about 
abuses of our DNA.  While a DNA profile is only a series of numbers, 
what people can do with those numbers is concerning.  Those numbers 
can be used to identify a person and implicate a person in a crime.  As 
DNA technology expands, so too will the amount of information able to 
be gleaned from those numbers.  In addition to the numbers that make 
up a person’s DNA profile, North Carolina also keeps the physical DNA 
sample.227  The sample contains one’s entire genetic code and reveals 
every personal detail about the individual.  These samples are kept as 
long as the profile exists—an entire lifetime for many people.  How safe 
are these samples and what can be done with them? 
One significant and troubling advance in DNA technology has al-
lowed scientists to fabricate DNA evidence.228  This is certainly an ad-
vance that greatly undermines the credibility of DNA evidence.  Scien-
tists have been able to fabricate both blood and saliva samples that 
replicate the DNA of a person other than the original donor of the blood 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
 226. Id. at 34. 
 227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3 (2011). 
 228. Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists Show, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/science/18dna.html?scp=1&sq= 
fabricate%20dna&st=cse.  The full scientific report mentioned in the article is available 
online at http://www.fsigenetics.com/article/S1872-4973(09)00099-4/abstract. 
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and saliva.229  In addition to creating samples, scientists can duplicate 
samples.230  Scientists have shown that if they have access to a DNA pro-
file in a DNA database, they will be able to create a duplicate of that 
sample.231  In the near future, will the North Carolina criminal justice 
system be compelled to investigate allegations of DNA fabrication, lapses 
in DNA sample security, or dishonest SBI lab technicians?  With the 
ability of scientists to duplicate already existing DNA samples, will juries 
soon be considering whether the DNA found at a crime scene was real, 
or a planted sample?  These false DNA samples are much easier to plant 
at crime scenes than actual fingerprints, and as our court system’s re-
liance on DNA technology increases, so should our fears that we rely too 
heavily on this evidence. 
One of the most troubling concerns is the seeming public embrace 
of DNA technology and laws similar to North Carolina’s based on the er-
roneous belief that a DNA sample is nothing more than the 21st cen-
tury’s fingerprint.  With a public acceptance of these forms of highly in-
vasive technology and the disregard for probable cause and 
individualized suspicion, there is a legitimate fear that the law will see an 
unprecedented expansion. 
In the future, is it possible that the DNA checkpoint will become as 
commonplace and as widely accepted as the DWI checkpoint?  In order 
to solve cold cases or search for killers on the loose, will courts permit 
law enforcement to set up a DNA checkpoint in the neighborhood to 
look for the killer?  In March 2010, Raleigh police performed the equiva-
lent of a DNA checkpoint in a neighborhood to look for a murderer.  In 
that case, law enforcement officers went door-to-door asking each 
neighbor in a neighborhood to submit DNA samples in order to elimi-
nate suspects.232  Those who refused samples were automatically consi-
dered suspects.233  While the police in that investigation took samples 
only from those who were willing, perhaps one day state statutes will au-
thorize law enforcement to take samples from the unwilling. 
Why does a person’s invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures automatically make him a 
suspect?  Some people refuse an officer’s request to search their car 
without probable cause on a matter of principle.  DNA sampling should 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Dan Bowens, Police Collect DNA Samples from Neighbors in Taft Investigation, 
WRAL, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.wral.com/ news/local/story/7293676/. 
 233. Id. 
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be no different.  The next time someone is pulled over for speeding, in 
addition to asking for the license and registration, will that person be 
asked for a DNA sample as well?  Will the legislature collect the DNA of 
speeding motorists on the off chance the motorist had committed an un-
solved crime in the past?  This idea seems absurd, but it is exactly what 
the DNA Database Act of 2010 authorizes—a suspicionless and warrant-
less search of a person and a seizure of his DNA to be used as evidence 
not of the present crime, but of crimes in the past he might have com-
mitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Every year, thousands of people are arrested on suspicion of a felo-
ny, but they are never convicted of anything.  The government, through 
the North Carolina DNA Database Act of 2010, is using arrest as an en-
titlement to seize and search an arrestee’s DNA.  The Act involves a war-
rantless search and seizure, without any individualized suspicion or 
probable cause, of an arrestee’s entire genetic profile, family history, per-
sonal information, and medical information in the form of a DNA pro-
file.  There is no question that the buccal cheek swab constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  Additionally, there is no question 
that the search is conducted without a warrant.  A warrantless search is 
per se unreasonable unless the government can demonstrate that it falls 
within certain well-defined exceptions to the Warrants Clause of the 
Constitution.  Unless North Carolina can establish that the warrantless, 
suspicionless, forcible taking of a buccal swab satisfies one of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, the search is unconstitutional.  Be-
cause the Act does not fall under one of the well-defined exceptions, it 
should be per se unconstitutional. 
This is the perfect example of how people lose their freedom.  Slow-
ly, people give up their freedom little by little in search of answering to 
the higher callings of justice, crime prevention, and technology.  The 
DNA Database Act of 2010 is the quintessence of North Carolinians 
gradually giving up their freedom.  If a person is arrested for a certain 
crime, regardless of whether he actually committed the crime, he must 
provide a DNA sample.  If as a matter of principle, that innocent person 
refuses to provide his DNA sample, he is thrown in jail without bond, 
for a potentially indefinite term.  This person is in judicial limbo. 
Judicial limbo, the sacrifice of individual freedoms, and quantum 
leaps to trample on the Constitution are not the American way.  North 
Carolina must find a way to balance the ability to use the awesome pow-
er of DNA technology in some way that will solve the state’s problems, 
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but it must be a way that does not require citizens to cede their liberty.  
North Carolina must return to the principle of innocent until proven 
guilty.  This Act requires us to ask, “Who sets the expectation of priva-
cy—the government, or us?”  The good intentions of the North Carolina 
General Assembly are to be commended, but their product in the form of 
the DNA Database Act of 2010 greatly endangers individual liberty and 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  The innocent should not be suspect 
in the eyes of the government.  The North Carolina DNA Database Act of 
2010 should be struck down as an unreasonable search and seizure and 
as an anathema to the Fourth Amendment. 
Michael J. Crook 
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